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Abstract: The valuation of farmland is a perennial issue for agricultural policy, given its 
importance in the farm investment portfolio. Despite the significance of farmland values to 
farmer wealth, prediction remains a difficult task. This study develops a dynamic 
information measure to examine the informational content of farmland values and farm 
income in explaining the distribution of farmland values over time. 
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1. Introduction 
The topic of real estate bubbles has gained prominence amidst the recent housing market crash and 
financial crisis. The related issue of bubbles in the rural land market is equally important given that 
farmland is the most important asset in the farm business and in the farm household investment 
portfolio. Volatility in farmland values generates potential economic hardship, especially for 
communities dependent upon agriculture for economic security [1]. Yet the valuation of farmland is 
not well understood and remains a problematic exercise [2]. 
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The dynamics of farmland pricing are only partially explained by market fundamentals in the  
long-run, with the relationship breaking down in the short-run. As indicated in Schmitz [3] farmland 
values appear to be in long-run equilibrium, but there is significant correlation in the short-run errors. 
In other words, farmland markets appear to be efficient in the long-run, but are not weakly efficient in 
the short-run. Copeland [4] defines a weakly efficient market (or a weak-form efficiency) as the case 
where investors cannot earn excess returns by trading rules based on historical prices and return 
information. Ingersoll [5] gives a similar definition based on random walks. Predicting farmland 
markets is thus important not only to the rural community but also for formulating policy responses 
during economic turmoil. 
Decomposing the information content of asset values is key to understanding the dynamics of 
farmland prices. Measuring the informational content of asset values originates with the work of Theil 
and Leenders [6] and Fama [7], who calculate the informational content of stock market prices using 
an information measure based on the entropy measure of Shannon [8]. Since then, use of entropy to 
forecast financial market volumes has become a valuable exercise [9–13]. We depart from the standard 
analysis in this paper to examine the informational content of changes in relative asset values and 
allow for a regional decomposition of the information measure. 
In particular, we are interested in the dynamic information content in farm returns and we extend 
the information measure in Moss, Mishra, and Erickson [14] to incorporate persistence into the entropy 
measure. Specifically, we let the signal in the previous year's information measure decay as the number 
of lags increases. This allows us to obtain a measure of the loss of information over time. This loss of 
information can also be interpreted as the additional entropy between time periods. Thus the larger this 
measure is, the greater the dispersion in information between the two sets of information measures. 
In the boom-bust cycle debate, one issue is the amount of new information contained in each year's 
income. Similar to the variance bounds formulations [15–17], if changes in farmland values are 
determined solely by changes in income then the information in the changes in farmland values cannot 
exceed the amount of information contained in changes in income. The concept is similar to the 
variance bounds concept in that given that asset values are derived from income, the variance in 
income places a bound on the variance in asset values. 
2. Information Theory and Economics 
Information theory, originating with Shannon [8], brought a technical and precise definition of 
information to the field of statistics. The technical notion of information states that outcomes 
conflicting with prior expectations should be given more weight than outcomes conforming to prior 
expectations. Shannon popularized the notion of entropy as the expected information from a 
distribution, and developed a quantified measure of information. The optimal measure of the amount 
of information, as developed by Shannon, is the entropy of an outcome or an event (or a signal in 
Shannon terminology) and is expressed as 
 
=1
= ln
N
i i
i
J p p
      
(1) 
where J  is the measure of entropy and ip  is the probability that a given event or signal will occur.  
As pi→1 then lnሺ݌௜ሻ→0, meaning a signal that is almost certain to occur contains no information. The 
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weighted average of each signal that could be received is the total amount of information in the signal. 
Entropy was proposed by Shannon as a way of measuring the information contained in a message that 
causes a change in prior expectations or probabilities. More generally, entropy measures the 
uncertainty or volatility of a random variable or distribution. Shannon named the measure entropy 
because of the similarity with the concept of thermodynamics entropy. Davis [18] is credited with 
introducing information theory to the econometrics literature while Theil [19] popularized the use of 
information theory (see [10] for a discussion). Golan [20] offers an excellent introduction to entropy 
measures and uses in econometrics. 
Kullback and Liebler [21] generalize Shannon-entropy and develop relative entropy, or  
cross-entropy, that measures how two distributions differ from each other. Specifically, cross-entropy 
measures the discrepancy or inequality between two distributions, thus often being referred to as a 
measure of information inequality. The Kullback-Leibler function is also interpreted as a measures of 
the difference of information content between distributions. Many generalizations of Shannon entropy 
exist, but the Kullback-Leibler function provides a meaningful information quantity that serves as the 
basis of the empirical application in this paper. 
Kullback-Leibler cross-entropy is basically a measure of unpredictability or uncertainty, measuring 
the divergence between two densities. Given N mutually exclusive events E = {E1,…,EN} each event 
has an associated probability of occurrence. The prior probabilities, xi, are the probabilities of an event 
occurring before a message is received and the posterior probabilities, yi, are the updated, or 
conditional, probabilities given the information content of the message. Formally stated then,  
cross-entropy measures the unpredictability of an event Ei given the event's prior and posterior 
probabilities of occurrence. 
The value of the information contained in the message is proportional to the inequality between the 
prior and posterior distributions since a greater discrepancy implies a more unexpected event. For 
example, if event E1 has a prior probability of 0.95 and a message is received resulting in an updated 
posterior probability of 0.05, then the message is informative since the probability of the event 
occurring went from high to low. However if the message results in an updated posterior probability  
of 0.94, then the message is uninformative (or at least no new information) since the probabilities 
remain mostly unchanged. This is similar to answering the question “what is the information gain 
between x and y” or “what is the distance or divergence between x and y”. 
Cross-entropy,  :I y x , is written as the logarithmic measure of the discrepancy or inequality 
between the prior and posterior probability distributions 
 
=1
: = ln 0.
N
i
i
i i
yI y x y
x
           (2) 
The cross-entropy,  :I y x , is a measure of the gain or loss in information as a result of the change 
from the prior probabilities to the posterior probabilities. When the logarithm in Equation 2 has 2 as a 
base, information is measured in binary digits, or bits. Often the natural log is used, in which case 
information is measured in nits, where 1 nit is equal to 1.443 bits. Given that the logarithm is a 
concave function,  :I y x  is always positive, meaning the value of the information in the message is 
always positive. The cross-entropy measure is also a monotonic function since the greater the 
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information in the signal the larger the value of the inequality. The more valuable the information in 
the message the greater the discrepancy, or information inequality, between the prior and the posterior. 
If  : 0I y x  , then no discrepancy exists between the prior and the posterior and so the message 
contains no information. If  :I y x  , then the discrepancy is so large that the information is 
infinitely valuable or that the receiver of the message is “infinitely” surprised by the information 
contained within that message [18]. 
The cross-entropy measure has useful aggregation properties that allow decomposition of the total 
entropy into a between-group information measure and a within-group information measure. Suppose 
that N  mutually exclusive events  1, , NE E E   can be aggregated into G N  sets of events, 
 1, , GS S S   so that each iE  belongs to exactly one gS , where 1, ,g G  . The prior and posterior 
probabilities can be aggregated so that 
=g i
i sg
X x


      (3) 
=g i
i sg
Y y


      (4) 
which are the sum of the prior and posterior probabilities, respectively, of the events in set gS . 
The cross-entropy measure  :I y x  in Equation 2 can be applied to each group gS . The within-group 
cross-entropy, gI , is 
 : = ln
i
gi
g
ii S gg
g
y
YyI y x xY
X

      

     (5) 
The between-group cross-entropy, 0I , is 
 0
=1
: = ln
G
g
g
g g
Y
I y x Y
X
          (6) 
The total cross-entropy is equal to the sum of the average within-group cross-entropy, g ggY I , and the 
between-group cross-entropy,  0 :I y x , 
     0
=1
: = : :
G
g g
g
I y x I y x Y I y x
     (7) 
The between-group entropy measures the information inequality across groups, whilst the within-
group entropy measures information inequality across events of set gS . The average within-group 
inequality, given by g gI Y I , is a weighted average of the individual within-group inequalities. 
Note that no implications about the content of the message are provided by the cross-entropy 
measure. The interpretation cross-entropy as a measure of information depends on the prior and posterior 
probability distributions involved as well as the context of the problem under consideration [23].  
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The terms ix , iy , iX , and iY  can be given an interpretation other than probabilities as long as they 
satisfy the properties of probabilities; non-negativity and summing up to unity. For example, consider 
the states of the United States and define ix  as state i  population divided by total U.S. population and 
then define iy  as per capita income of state i  divided by total U.S. per capita income. The terms ix  
and iy  now have the interpretation of shares, which satisfy the properties of probabilities. Moreover, 
the cross-entropy measure in Equation 2 has the interpretation of a state income-inequality measure. 
The income-inequality measure takes on positive values when per-capita incomes among the states 
differ and reduces to zero in the instance of no income-inequality. The aggregate decomposition in 
Equation 3 through Equation 7 can be used to define regions of the U.S. and compare between-region 
and within-region income-inequality. 
3. Entropy Model and Data 
The starting point is a typical farmland pricing formula based on the net present value framework 
for land price determinantion with rational expectations. Specifically, the model explains the value of 
land based on changes in asset valuation over time using the differential model of farmland values 
proposed by Schmitz [3] 
 
   
   
 
1 1
=1
=0
E | E | E |
=
11 1
t t t i t t i tt t
t i
itj
t j
j
CF CF CFrVV
rr r
   

       
 
    (8) 
where tV  is the farmland value per acre at time t , 1t t tV V V     is the difference in farmland values, 
 1|t tE CF   is the expected value of cash flows to farmland (typically Ricardian rent) given the 
information available at time 1t  , where the information set is denoted 1t  , and tr  is the effective 
discount rate (or opportunity cost of capital) at time t . Schmitz assumes that 
   
 
1
=1
=0
E | E |
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1
t i t t i t
t i
i
t j
j
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
  

 
     (9) 
where t  becomes white noise, meaning no information remains in the residual term. However, 
Schmitz rejects the hypothesis that the residuals are white noise using a Ljung-Box test. Thus, while 
farmland appears to be appropriately priced in the long-run, the series contains significant information 
which could support the notion of rational bubbles. 
To measure the persistence in farm returns, this paper proposes an extension of the information 
measure used by Moss, Mishra, and Erickson [14]. Specifically, we let itp  be the share of farm 
revenues this year and , 1i tp   be the share of farm revenues last year. Therefore, a measure of the new 
information 1tI  in t  from Equations 8 and 9 is 
1
=1 , 1
= ln
n
it
t it
i i t
pI p
p 
           (10) 
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This information inequality measures the relative persistence in the spatial value of land prices and 
represents a dynamic information inequality. The lagged share can be thought of as a dynamic 
probability. 
Next, we consider the decay of the information in the signal by computing the information in the 
second lagged shares , 2i tp   denoted 2tI  defined as 
2
=1 , 2
= ln
n
it
t it
i i t
pI p
p 
           (11) 
Taking the difference between Equations 11 and 10 yields a dynamic information inequality that 
measures the loss of information (additional entropy between data points) 
       21 , 2 , , 1
=1
, 1
=1 , 2
= ln ln ln ln
= ln
n
t it it i t i t i t
i
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i t
it
i i t
I p p p p p
p
p
p
 


     
    


   (12) 
The larger the number, the greater the dispersion in information between the two information sets. If 
the value is positive, there is an information loss, meaning the first information lag is less than the 
second information lag so the information in the measure is increasing. Equations 10, 11, and 12 can 
be similarly derived for the total value of farmland as well as a cross-inequality between total land 
values and net value added (where net value added is the prior probability and total land value is the 
posterior). 
Data are published by the National Agriculture Statistics Service (NASS) of the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture for 1950 through 2008. Farm real estate values are obtained from the Agricultural Land 
Values and Cash Rents publication. Land in farms are obtained from the Farms, Land in Farms, and 
Livestock publication. Farm real estate values are defined as the per acre dollar value of all land and 
buildings used for agricultural production. Land in farms is defined as the total acres of farmland, in 
thousands of acres, for each state. The total value of farm real estate is computed by multiplying the 
per acre dollar real estate value by the total number of acres of farmland for each state. Net value 
added is used in place of the more traditional net farm income for describing farm revenues. Net value 
added (NVA) includes the net returns to all equity and non-equity holders and thus represents the 
contribution of agriculture to the overall economic activity of the United States. 
4. Results 
The results for the information change across time periods are presented in Table 1 for the ten 
Economic Research Regions. In this study we use the traditional regions with the Northeastern states 
include Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont, Lake States are Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin; the Corn 
Belt region includes Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, and Ohio; the Appalachian region includes 
Kentucky, North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia; the Southeast states are Alabama, 
Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina; Delta States are Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi; the 
Southern Plains states are Oklahoma and Texas; the Mountain region includes Arizona, Colorado, 
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Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming; and the Pacific states are California, 
Oregon, and Washington. The results in this table indicate whether income (net value added) contains 
dynamic information. At the mean and median there is little change in the information set for value 
added. In other words, the dynamic probability doesn't change the prediction very much. Moreover, 
many of the information measures are negative, indicating that the first lag may contain more noise 
than the second lag. Thus, even if the mean and median are positive, if the first quantile (Q1) is 
negative, the most recent information may simply add noise. This oscillation is somewhat consistent 
with the dynamic adjustment found by Burt [24]. 
Table 1. Dynamic Information Inequality in Value Added. 
Statistic 21I  31I  41I  51I   21I  31I  41I  51I  
 Northeast  Lake States 
Min −3.92 −4.89 −3.67 −4.53  −1.98 −5.47 −5.79 −5.62 
Q1 −0.31 −0.15 −0.04 0.05  −0.30 −0.40 −0.28 −0.19 
Median 0.04 0.14 0.47 0.50  0.02 −0.01 0.00 0.17 
Q3 0.69 0.76 1.00 0.95  0.36 0.52 0.59 0.57 
Max 2.97 2.83 4.38 5.26  5.58 5.51 2.31 4.49 
Mean 0.18 0.24 0.54 0.63  0.12 0.16 0.03 0.20 
Std. Dev. 1.08 1.15 1.16 1.34  1.10 1.45 1.13 1.33 
 Corn Belt  Northern Plains 
Min −4.57 −3.06 −2.90 −2.66  −11.23 −3.85 −5.98 −5.33 
Q1 −0.96 −0.32 −0.42 −0.22  −0.65 −0.21 −0.23 −0.17 
Median −0.10 0.07 0.19 0.13  −0.16 0.11 0.32 0.29 
Q3 0.33 0.50 0.60 0.67  0.37 0.65 0.97 1.44 
Max 3.06 3.12 3.18 3.09  5.71 7.18 12.10 7.51 
Mean −0.09 0.15 0.15 0.22  −0.15 0.43 0.62 0.58 
Std. Dev. 1.21 1.05 1.02 1.06  2.48 1.80 3.01 1.92 
 Appalachia  Southeast 
Min −1.79 −1.15 −1.36 −0.96  −4.41 −4.78 −4.47 −4.75 
Q1 −0.29 −0.04 −0.06 −0.01  −0.44 −0.29 0.22 −0.09 
Median −0.08 0.19 0.36 0.40  −0.13 0.12 0.24 0.35 
Q3 0.20 0.67 1.06 1.19  0.10 0.62 1.08 0.78 
Max 1.30 2.07 3.33 4.17  4.82 2.86 3.95 4.53 
Mean −0.06 0.27 0.53 0.70  −0.11 0.10 0.45 0.45 
Std. Dev. 0.58 0.63 0.97 1.07  1.17 1.09 1.37 1.29 
 Delta States  Southern Plains 
Min −3.05 −2.63 −1.88 −1.73  −1.42 −1.59 −1.33 −1.08 
Q1 −0.43 −0.31 −0.09 −0.32  −0.22 −0.19 −0.15 −0.12 
Median −0.05 0.02 0.04 0.09  −0.01 0.00 0.03 0.05 
Q3 0.08 0.47 0.19 0.46  0.12 0.27 0.30 0.42 
Max 2.74 2.91 3.01 3.66  1.36 2.12 1.87 1.82 
Mean −0.16 0.04 0.09 0.16  −0.02 0.09 0.09 0.16 
Std. Dev. 0.83 0.98 0.81 0.92  0.50 0.66 0.61 0.60 
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Table 1. Cont. 
Statistic 21I  31I  41I  51I   21I  31I  41I  51I  
 Mountain  Pacific States 
Min −9.18 −8.83 −9.46 −9.67  −0.59 −0.40 −0.21 −0.36 
Q1 −0.95 0.05 −0.12 0.04  −0.14 −0.10 −0.07 −0.06 
Median −0.14 0.44 0.41 0.52  −0.03 0.01 0.06 0.04 
Q3 0.28 1.42 1.48 2.34  0.07 0.18 0.25 0.34 
Max 8.36 5.93 7.77 9.45  0.37 0.69 0.82 1.22 
Mean −0.41 0.81 1.01 1.19  −0.04 0.06 0.12 0.16 
Std. Dev. 2.10 2.13 2.69 2.90  0.21 0.23 0.23 0.32 
 Regional Inequality  Overall Inequality 
Min −3.36 −2.39 −0.91 −2.08  −4.54 −2.76 −1.46 −2.17 
Q1 −0.41 −0.12 −0.08 0.11  −0.88 0.04 0.05 0.24 
Median −0.17 0.22 0.30 0.48  −0.19 0.40 0.59 0.89 
Q3 0.04 0.49 0.63 1.06  0.20 0.94 0.99 1.58 
Max 2.60 2.75 1.80 3.15  3.34 3.11 3.02 4.69 
Mean −0.18 0.28 0.30 0.58  −0.26 0.49 0.60 0.96 
Std. Dev. 0.87 0.89 0.63 0.93  1.18 1.10 0.92 1.14 
 
A typical result for the information measure reported in Table 1 is that the change in information is 
initially negative becoming positive in the second difference. Typically, the change in information 
becomes increasingly positive for the remaining two differences. For example, the mean and median 
21 tI  are both negative for the Corn Belt (−0.09 and −0.10, respectively) while the mean and median 
31 tI  are positive (0.07 and 0.15, respectively). This may be the result of optimizing behavior at the 
farm level. Specifically, higher profits resulting from exogenous factors such as weather or demand 
shocks may result in increased plantings that reduce the relative profitability in the intermediate run. 
Alternatively, the loss of information may simply be the result of uncertainty caused by short-run 
noise. In almost all cases, the first quantile remains negative, indicating that at least 25 percent of the 
time the new information does not reduce the information measure. Further, the first quartile is only 
negative for 21 tI  in the Corn Belt. Thus, the newer information on net value added is informative at 
least 75 percent of the time. 
The value of the change in information contains nonparametric information about the changes in 
income into permanent and transitory components. Specifically, if the returns follow a random walk 
the change in information would be large and positive (especially if the innovations were uncorrelated 
within a particular region). That is new information would result in differences between the prior and 
posterior shares of income. However, as the returns become less highly autocorrelated the information 
measure decay because the returns would not depart significantly from their original shares. That is the 
distribution of returns across states would not diverge because of permanent shocks. As the length of 
the change increases, the short-run (transitory) shocks average out while the long-run (persistent or 
permanent) information across states in a region remains. Alternatively, in the parlance of 
nonstationarity, the transitory effect yields a bounded variance while the permanent effect grows 
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arithmetically over time. Following the implication of Equation 8, transitory variation cannot explain 
permanent changes (in farmland values). 
Thus, the mean and median changes in inequality along with the asymmetry of the change in 
equality contain information about the relative persistence of changes in income. Across all regions, 
only the Northeast possesses both a positive initial change in information and a positive asymmetry in 
information change (i.e., the median less the first quantile is 0.35 while the third quantile less the 
median is 0.65). Hence, the income changes in the Northeast contain the greatest quantity of 
information about the distribution of future income (at least initially). In the long-run the Mountain 
region contains the greatest median information at 0.52. The Lake States, Corn Belt, Delta States, 
Southern Plains, and Pacific States all have small long-run changes in information. The differences in 
the change in long-run information may be due to several factors. One temptation may be to equate the 
significance of farm policy with the lack of information since the Lake States, Corn Belt, Delta States, 
and Southern Plains are reliant on program crops (specifically, corn, cotton, soybeans, and wheat) 
while Northeast is less dependent on agricultural policy (with the exception of dairy payments in  
New York). However, other factors such as farm size and weather risk should also be considered in 
future studies. 
The results for the information change across time periods based on total farmland values are 
presented in Table 2. The results in this table examine the value of the dynamic information in land 
values. Looking at the change in the relative asset values yields some significant changes in the 
information set. For example, the median for the Northeast increases from 0.07 to 0.16 to 0.40, so there 
are noteworthy changes in the information measure. More recent values contain more information than 
lagged values. The consistency of this result across regions and lags indicates that more recent 
information always yields more information in regards to the total value of farmland. 
Table 2. Dynamic Information Inequality in Land Values. 
Statistic 21I  31I  41I  51I   21I  31I  41I  51I  
 Northeast  Lake States 
Min −0.06 −0.05 −0.09 −0.05  −0.16 −0.05 −0.03 −0.13 
Q1 0.03 0.10 0.16 0.22  0.01 0.01 0.02 0.09 
Median 0.07 0.16 0.23 0.40  0.04 0.09 0.16 0.16 
Q3 0.14 0.35 0.53 0.93  0.13 0.18 0.29 0.45 
Max 1.51 2.33 2.22 2.12  1.30 1.60 1.40 1.05 
Mean 0.13 0.28 0.42 0.57  0.12 0.18 0.25 0.29 
Std. Dev. 1.08 0.37 0.45 0.49  0.24 0.30 0.34 0.31 
 Corn Belt  Northern Plains 
Min −0.05 −0.09 −0.13 −0.12  −0.08 −0.11 −0.02 −0.02 
Q1 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.02  0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 
Median 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.09  0.02 0.05 0.07 0.11 
Q3 0.08 0.15 0.21 0.23  0.06 0.09 0.15 0.23 
Max 0.87 0.82 0.73 0.61  0.28 0.51 0.62 0.87 
Mean 0.08 0.11 0.15 0.13  0.04 0.08 0.12 0.15 
Std. Dev. 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.16  0.06 0.12 0.14 0.16 
 
Entropy 2011, 13  
 
 
47
Table 2. Cont. 
Statistic 21I  31I  41I  51I   21I  31I  41I  51I  
 Appalachia  Southeast 
Min −0.12 −0.02 −0.04 0.00  −0.32 −0.39 −0.33 −0.27 
Q1 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.10  0.02 0.05 0.09 0.19 
Median 0.04 0.07 0.13 0.19  0.06 0.11 0.22 0.30 
Q3 0.07 0.14 0.24 0.30  0.14 0.35 0.46 0.70 
Max 0.39 0.51 0.62 0.94  1.21 1.27 1.63 2.81 
Mean 0.05 0.11 0.17 0.23  0.11 0.24 0.40 0.54 
Std. Dev. 0.07 0.11 0.14 0.19  0.20 0.31 0.46 0.63 
 Delta States  Southern Plains 
Min −0.05 −0.08 −0.21 −0.34  −0.04 −0.08 −0.08 −0.08 
Q1 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Median 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.09  0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 
Q3 0.07 0.12 0.16 0.20  0.04 0.07 0.11 0.15 
Max 0.62 0.77 0.95 1.38  0.59 1.11 1.65 2.10 
Mean 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.16  0.04 0.08 0.13 0.17 
Std. Dev. 0.10 0.17 0.21 0.28  0.11 0.21 0.32 0.40 
 Mountain  Pacific States 
Min −1.94 −1.14 −1.01 −1.83  −0.03 −0.08 −0.06 −0.07 
Q1 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.14  0.01 0.02 0.03 0.07 
Median 0.06 0.15 0.19 0.39  0.04 0.08 0.16 0.22 
Q3 0.09 0.37 0.58 0.76  0.11 0.32 0.48 0.53 
Max 5.24 5.25 5.47 5.50  0.49 0.65 0.81 1.11 
Mean 0.15 0.33 0.51 0.68  0.08 0.16 0.25 0.35 
Std. Dev. 0.75 0.85 1.02 1.18  0.10 0.18 0.25 0.34 
 Regional Inequality  Overall Inequality 
Min −0.13 −0.12 −0.01 0.04  −0.30 −0.19 −0.03 −0.07 
Q1 0.03 0.07 0.14 0.20  0.07 0.16 0.27 0.41 
Median 0.05 0.13 0.19 0.30  0.11 0.24 0.40 0.57 
Q3 0.13 0.26 0.46 0.61  0.19 0.54 0.83 1.03 
Max 0.67 1.12 2.16 2.80  1.05 1.62 2.60 3.58 
Mean 0.11 0.24 0.38 0.52  0.18 0.40 0.62 0.84 
Std. Dev. 0.14 0.28 0.43 0.56  0.23 0.39 0.56 0.69 
 
Given that the information measures are greater than zero for the median and mean throughout 
Table 2, the question is whether the information measures are increasing or decreasing over time. In all 
cases, 1 21j I I    for each region. Hence, the information in the sample declines over time or 
information loss occurs in farmland values. The next question is whether this information loss is 
occurring at an increasing or decreasing rate. To measure this concept we adopt the measure of 
logarithmic concavity proposed by Hansen [25]. Specifically, a positive measure is logarithmically 
concave if 
2
1 1 , = 1,2,n n na a a n        (13) 
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and logarithmically convex if 
2
1 1 , = 1,2, .n n na a a n        (14) 
To apply this concept to the information measures, we compute 
 
 
2
1 31 21 41
2
2 41 31 51
=
=
t I I I
t I I I
   
        
 (15) 
If 1 2, 0t t   then the information measure is concave while if 1 2, 0t t   the measure is convex. Applying 
these rules to the median and mean information in Table 2 we see that the median of the information 
measure is concave in the Corn Belt, Appalachia, and the Southeast regions, and the mean of the 
information measure is concave in the Northeast, Corn Belt, Appalachia, Southeast, and Delta regions. 
Further, neither measure is convex in any region. Hence, the information loss is increasing at an 
increasing rate. 
As in our discussion of changes in the information in returns from Table 1, the change in 
information of farmland values has information about the decomposition of these changes into 
permanent and transitory components. Several Falk [26] provides evidence that farmland values are 
nonstationary. Hence, errors tend to be permanent. This result is largely borne out in Table 2 in that 
both the mean and median information measures are uniformly positive for every state. In fact the first 
quantile is positive for every state at every time period. Again, mimicking the results in Table 1, the 
median measure of the change in information is highest for the Northeast (increasing to 0.40 for the 
fourth change) and Mountain (increasing to 0.39 for the fourth change) regions and the smallest for the 
Corn Belt (reaching a maximum of 0.09), Delta States (reaching a maximum of 0.09), and Southern 
Plains (reaching a maximum of 0.05). In this case, the size of the change in information measures the 
similarity between farmland in each region. Specifically, if dispersion between farmland shares is 
permanent because of stationarity, when the errors are highly correlated (the Wiener increment in the 
random walk is correlated) the farmland values do not wander far from each other. This correlation 
may be a artifact of cointegration. Thus, the Corn Belt, Delta States, and Southern Plains are composed 
of states with similar farmland value changes over time. However, there is more dispersion in the 
Northeast and the Mountain regions. This result is plausible because of the number of states in each 
region and the dispersion of crops and practices. 
Table 3 gives the difference in information on current land values based on changes in lagged 
returns. Results presented here look at the dynamic information in net value added in predicting land 
values. Thus, the results indicate the predictive value of returns in the explanation of current land 
values changes over time. The results for this measure are fairly diverse across regions. For example, 
the mean information is consistently positive for the Northeast (reaching a maximum of 0.16), 
Southeast (reaching a maximum of 0.27) and Southern Plains (reaching a maximum of 0.09) regions 
implying that more recent information on returns is informative in explaining farmland values on 
average. In addition, the median is consistently positive for the Northeast region. However, the first 
quartile for each distribution is consistently negative. Alternatively, the mean and median information 
measure for the Northern Plains, Appalachia, Mountain States, and Pacific States is always negative. 
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Building on Equation 15, the information measure is concave for both the mean and median in the 
Northeast region. 
The critical insight from Shiller [16] is that the variance of an asset (such as a stock price) cannot 
exceed the variance of the return sequence (such as the dividends) on which the price of that asset is 
based. Hence, the variance of asset values (farmland) must be bounded by the variance of its returns 
series (returns to farmland). Table 3 indicates that information on the dispersion in returns do not 
significantly explain the dispersion of farmland values. Further, interquartile range of the change in 
information in returns in predicting farmland values (in Table 3) are much larger than the interquartile 
range of the change in information in farmland values (in Table 2). For example, the interquartile 
range for the change in information for the Corn Belt are 0.07, 0.13, 0.17, and 0.21 for changes in 
farmland value compared with 2.03, 1.52, 1.29, and 1.54 for the information in farmland returns in 
predicting values. Thus, the dispersion in farmland values is smaller than the dispersion in returns 
consistent with the insight from Shiller. 
Table 3. Dynamic Information Cross Inequality Between Land Values and Valued Added. 
Statistic 21I  31I  41I  51I   21I  31I  41I  51I  
 Northeast  Lake States 
Min −6.21 −6.77 −5.03 −4.94  −4.99 −4.97 −4.53 −4.99 
Q1 −1.21 −1.00 −0.91 −1.10  −0.67 −0.70 −0.61 −0.96 
Median 0.04 0.18 0.22 0.15  −0.06 −0.10 −0.12 −0.17 
Q3 0.81 1.23 0.98 1.10  0.62 0.56 0.48 0.47 
Max 4.96 4.07 5.48 5.53  4.55 4.58 4.01 5.28 
Mean 0.01 0.04 0.12 0.16  −0.10 −0.15 −0.18 −0.21 
Std. Dev. 1.92 1.94 1.90 2.30  1.63 1.50 1.55 1.70 
 Corn Belt  Northern Plains 
Min −3.48 −3.12 −2.65 −3.75  −5.84 −4.84 −9.24 −6.72 
Q1 −1.22 −0.87 −0.74 −0.81  −0.98 −0.86 −0.95 −0.93 
Median −0.07 0.00 0.00 −0.12  −0.03 −0.05 −0.09 −0.10 
Q3 0.81 0.65 0.55 0.73  1.04 0.50 0.92 0.77 
Max 3.00 3.77 2.25 2.67  9.80 9.48 9.51 9.24 
Mean −0.03 −0.04 −0.02 −0.01  −0.06 −0.05 −0.09 −0.03 
Std. Dev. 1.26 1.27 1.11 1.30  2.15 2.24 2.67 2.47 
 Appalachia  Southeast 
Min −5.93 −8.95 −12.79 −13.71  −7.96 −7.74 −7.11 −8.35 
Q1 −1.50 −2.10 −2.70 −3.23  −0.64 −0.51 −0.62 −0.54 
Median −0.18 −0.43 −0.51 −0.76  0.12 0.11 −0.03 −0.16 
Q3 0.85 0.99 0.74 0.76  0.55 0.72 0.73 0.99 
Max 9.56 9.67 13.34 16.24  7.44 6.35 5.76 7.45 
Mean −0.33 −0.53 −0.69 −0.77  0.05 0.07 0.14 0.27 
Std. Dev. 2.44 3.60 4.70 5.51  2.14 1.99 1.82 2.44 
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Table 3. Cont. 
Statistic 21I  31I  41I  51I   21I  31I  41I  51I  
 Delta States  Southern Plains 
Min −4.53 −4.75 −3.47 −4.57  −2.56 −2.44 −2.40 −0.98 
Q1 −0.46 −0.59 −0.62 −0.51  −0.12 -0.15 -0.10 −0.11 
Median −0.03 −0.08 −0.05 −0.15  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 
Q3 0.30 0.35 0.36 0.31  0.19 0.16 0.20 0.24 
Max 4.77 5.81 3.64 5.40  2.55 2.85 2.81 2.65 
Mean −0.06 −0.08 −0.14 −0.15  0.02 0.04 0.05 0.09 
Std. Dev. 1.16 1.40 1.05 1.21  0.60 0.66 0.64 0.54 
 Mountain  Pacific States 
Min −12.42 −16.38 −19.80 −20.01  −1.42 −2.15 −2.39 −2.35 
Q1 −1.31 −1.67 −2.57 −2.54  −0.27 −0.27 −0.33 −0.54 
Median −0.20 −0.35 -0.19 0.13  −0.09 −0.06 −0.06 −0.06 
Q3 0.57 0.82 1.45 1.09  0.18 0.15 0.15 0.25 
Max 15.93 16.35 14.27 17.84  0.85 0.72 0.83 1.00 
Mean −0.22 −0.42 −0.42 −0.31  −0.08 −0.11 −0.13 −0.13 
Std. Dev. 3.33 4.12 4.55 4.87  0.43 0.47 0.54 0.64 
 Regional Inequality  Overall Inequality 
Min −4.21 −3.85 −3.30 −3.44  −5.50 −4.79 −4.43 −4.24 
Q1 −0.57 −1.00 −0.80 −1.06  −0.85 −1.48 −1.26 −1.42 
Median −0.17 −0.26 −0.13 0.02  −0.25 −0.26 0.01 −0.20 
Q3 0.67 0.50 0.58 0.73  0.72 0.66 0.72 1.15 
Max 3.69 4.34 3.51 3.66  4.39 4.13 4.95 4.65 
Mean −0.11 −0.16 −0.18 −0.13  −0.18 −0.28 −0.31 −0.22 
Std. Dev. 1.35 1.51 1.32 1.55  1.66 1.84 1.75 2.02 
5. Conclusions 
This paper examines the change in information in net value added to farmland and farmland values 
over time and the relationship between the two. Results indicate that new information increases the 
entropy in the short-run, but reduces the entropy in the signal in the intermediate run. This loss in 
short-run information may be the result of random shocks which do not persist or producer response to 
market changes, a finding consistent with Burt [24]. However, changes in information are consistently 
positive (even at the first quantile) for farmland values. Hence, more recent data on farmland values is 
relatively more informative than recent data on net value added. 
The results for the information in farmland values over time are fairly uniform. The minimum and 
first quartiles of the information measures are negative while the median, third quartile, maximum, and 
mean are generally positive. In addition, most are increasing, though by varying magnitudes. This 
result may contain information about the differential value of information by region. For example the 
Mountain states have a very high maximum value which is much larger than the other regions. The 
mean and median information for the Northeast and Southeast are consistently positive. However, the 
same values are consistently negative for the Northern Plains, Appalachia, Mountain States, and 
Entropy 2011, 13  
 
 
51
Pacific States. This result is consistent with Schmitz [3] in that short-run variations in net value added 
(or net returns to farmland) may contain significant noise. 
The results are less consistent for the lagged information of returns in predicting farmland values. 
For example, while the means and medians are negative for many regions, they are positive for the 
Northeast, Southeast, and Southern Plains. The maximum values are also quite a bit higher than for the 
information contained in lagged farmland values, moreover the range in general is wider. Returning to 
the possibility of excess volatility, the data supports the contention that the variation in farmland 
values is smaller than the variation in net value added. Thus, farmland prices may be more consistent 
with variance bounds than common stocks under the formulation of Shiller [16]. 
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